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As in other OECD countries, public pension insolvency is now one of
the most serious problems that an aging society poses for the Japanese
economy. The proportion of people aged 65 and above—19.5 percent in
2004, which is close to the OECD average—is expected to grow faster than
in any other advanced country. The latest oﬃcial population projections,
published in December 2006, expect the share of elderly to rise to 30.5 per-
cent in 2025 and 39.6 percent in 2050. These projections assume that the
fertility rate will remain low at 1.26 by 2050, expecting no substantial re-
covery from 1.26 in 2005.
Rapid population aging is a big challenge to the sustainability of the so-
cial security system, which relies heavily on future generations. Under
strong demographic pressures, the government announced a pension re-
form plan in 1999, which has been implemented since April 2000. Since
Japan’s public pension program is basically a pay-as-you-go system, the
government must reduce beneﬁts and/or increase contributions in order
to keep the programs ﬁnancially sustainable. To ﬁnance pension beneﬁts
promised in the 1994 Reform, the contribution rate must eventually in-
crease to 34.5 percent, which seems unacceptable. The 2000 Reform thus
incorporates measures to hold down the burden on future generations by
making eligibility conditions and beneﬁt schemes less generous than pre-
viously scheduled.
Still, the chance that the 2000 reform will fail to solve insolvency prob-
lems is very high, since it is still based on seemingly overestimated popu-
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show that the public pension fund would be exhausted by 2050, even with
several changes called for by the 2000 Reform. Net pension liabilities are
estimated to be 550 trillion yen, about 108 percent of net GDP, at the end
of ﬁscal year 1999 and will probably keep increasing.
It should be noted, however, that the typical approach to the ﬁnancial li-
abilities often ignores the eﬀect of policy changes on the labor supply of el-
derly people. It is important to understand retirement incentive eﬀects in
order to assess the full impact of pension reforms on the ﬁnancial liabili-
ties of the systems. Those eﬀects will be critical in Japan, since postwar
baby-boomers will become eligible for public pension beneﬁts in the next
few years. The reform that raise labor supply among the elderly can im-
prove the ﬁscal position of the social security system and other public sec-
tor, but the ﬁscal implications will depend much on the provisions of the
system.
This chapter aims to illustrate how social security reforms aﬀect the ﬁ-
nancial balance sheet of retirement income systems through a change in re-
tirement decisions by elderly workers. The reforms considered in this chap-
ter are chosen for the purpose of cross-country comparisons and are not
proposed as desirable or politically feasible in Japan. It should be also
noted that the reforms are being compared to the pre-2000 Reform system,
not necessarily to a solvent system. In addition, the incentive measures in
this article are calculated based on the social security schemes as of the
year 1996 when the data we use were surveyed. However, the basic structure
of the social security programs remains the same after the Reform, and
main messages and policy implications in this chapter are still relevant.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 7.2 provides a brief pic-
ture of retirement programs in Japan. Section 7.3 presents the base model
used for analysis. Section 7.4 describes the simulation methodology and is-
sues that arise in Japan, section 7.5 presents simulation results and dis-
cusses their policy implications, and section 7.6 concludes.
7.2 Institutional Background
7.2.1 Public Pension Plans
The principal program for private sector employees in Japan is the Kosei-
Nenkin-Hoken (KNH), which covers about 85 percent of all employees.
Government employees, private school teachers, and employees in agri-
culture/forestry/ﬁshing organizations are covered by special programs 
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1. The 2000 Reform was based on 1998 population projections, which unrealistically ex-
pected the fertility rate to smoothly recover to 1.61 by 2050.provided by Kyosai-Kumiai (mutual aid associations), but those programs
have almost the same structure as the KNH. Thus, our analysis of public
pensions in this paper mainly focuses on the KNH, and treats Kyosai-
Kumiai members as KNH members.
The KNH operates a two-tier system. One pays ﬂat-rate Basic Pension
(Kiso Nenkin) beneﬁts, which are applied to all residents: not only employ-
ees, but also the self-employed and unpaid family workers. Full Basic Pen-
sion beneﬁts paid to those with 40-year contributions are about 67,000 yen
per month. The other pays earnings-related beneﬁts, which are only for
private and public employees. Those beneﬁts are calculated as the career
average monthly earnings   the number of contribution years   the actu-
arial rate (which diﬀers by birth year). Both beneﬁts are inﬂation-indexed
every year in terms of consumer prices, and adjusted for wage growth every
f ﬁve years.2
The normal eligibility age for full KNH beneﬁts—both ﬂat-rate and
earnings-related components—had been 65 until 1999, but one could get
full beneﬁts at age 60 if he or she retired and stopped working at that age.
Since 2001, however, the eligibility age for the ﬂat-rate beneﬁts is raised by
one year every three years. And beginning in 2013, the eligibility age for the
earnings-related beneﬁts will also be raised by one year every three years.
These two steps of increasing the eligibility age have been called for by the
1994 and 2000 Reforms. If they are implemented as scheduled, men who
were born in 1961 and later and women who were born in 1966 and later
will receive no pension beneﬁts until age 65.
It should be also noted that a KNH recipient, who keeps working dur-
ing ages 60 and 64, can receive reduced KNH beneﬁts subject to an earn-
ings test. This scheme, which is called the Zaishoku Pension, is roughly
equivalent to the early retirement system in many other OECD countries.
If the total of monthly earnings and KNH beneﬁts exceed 280,000 yen, the
marginal tax rate is 50 percent. For high-salaried elderly workers who earn
more than 480,000 yen a month, the marginal tax rate is 100 percent. One
has to pay KNH contributions as long as he or she keeps working, al-
though he or she can expect an increase in future pension beneﬁts.
Contributions are based on the employee’s monthly standard earnings
and are shared equally by the employee and employer. The total contribu-
tion rate for the KNH Pension—covering both the ﬂat-rate and earnings-
related components—is currently 14.642 percent, meaning that an em-
ployee and employer contribute 7.321 percent each. A female employee
pays premiums at the same contribution rate, while a dependent housewife
does not need to contribute.
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2. This wage indexation was abolished in the 2000 Reform. The current system has only the
price indexation.7.2.2 Other Income Support
Unemployment insurance (UI) adds temporary income support to re-
tired employees. In many cases, an individual who reaches age 60 leaves the
ﬁrm where she or he has been working, and starts to receive KNH beneﬁts.
At the same time, it is normal to apply for UI beneﬁts when quitting one’s
previous job, regardless of one’s wish to ﬁnd a new job. Unemployment in-
surance beneﬁts for those of age 60 to 64 replace 45 to 80 percent of wage
earnings at age 60, for 240 days at most. There had been many cases where
the total replacement rate—adding KNH and UI beneﬁts together—was
eﬀectively more than 100 percent of income at the ﬁrst retirement age,
probably reducing the incentive to work. Under a new law, eﬀective April
of 1998, however, an individual cannot receive UI and KNH beneﬁts at the
same time; as long as one is receiving UI beneﬁts, one has to postpone re-
ceipt of KNH beneﬁts.
Another income support that potentially interacts with public pension
programs is the wage subsidy (WS) to elderly workers. This program was
introduced in 1994 as a part of the public employment insurance scheme to
replace the aforementioned UI beneﬁts. The WS, which is equivalent to 15
percent of the current wage, is provided to an employee—subject to a cer-
tain wage ceiling—on condition that he or she is 60 to 64 years old and his
or her wage earnings are less than 75 percent lower than his or her prere-
tirement wage at age 60.
This WS program is independent from the public pension scheme, but its
economic implications are similar to those of the Zaishoku Pension. Both
programs are applicable to the same age group (60–64) and subject to cer-
tain earnings criteria. The WS can be treated as a negative premium in cal-
culating social security incentives. The WS equivalent to 15 percent of wage
earnings can exceed the employee’s share of KNH contributions (7.321 per-
cent). The combination of the WS and pension premium thus would add 
to an individual’s net pension wealth, although it may not be enough to
oﬀset the negative eﬀect from postponing receipt of pension beneﬁts.
7.2.3 2000 Pension Reform
The 2000 Reform incorporated measures to lower contributions paid by
future generations, making it inevitable that the eligibility conditions and
beneﬁt system would become less generous than scheduled in the 1994 Pen-
sion Reform. In particular, the 2000 Reform called for:
• a 5 percent reduction in earnings-related beneﬁts
• a gradual increase in the eligible age of the earnings-related beneﬁts to
65, from 60 since 2013 (in addition to the already-scheduled increase
of the eligibility age to 65, from 60 during 2000 and 2013, called for by
the 1995 Pension Reform)
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• applying an earnings test for KNH beneﬁts to high-salaried workers
who are 65 years old and above
• a rise in the ratio of the subsidy from the central government to one-
half, from the current one-third of Basic Pension beneﬁts (without re-
ferring to any speciﬁc tax reform).
If these proposals are implemented as scheduled, the ﬁnal contribution
rate for KNH will be eventually pushed up to 25 percent, in contrast to the
previously scheduled 34.5 percent. And the pension fund, which amounts
to 144 trillion yen at the end of ﬁscal 1999, will not be exhausted over the
next ﬁfty years and more.
However, the risk that this 2000 Reform fails to raise sustainability of the
overall social security scheme is high, because the reform depends on the
seemingly optimistic estimations of population growth and rosy macro-
economic forecasts. Indeed, several simulations conducted by private think
tanks and researchers show that the pension fund is likely to turn into a
deﬁcit by 2050, with more realistic assumptions about fertility rates, inter-
est rates, and inﬂation rates.
7.3 Base Model
7.3.1 Data Source
Our analysis is based on the Survey on Labor Market Participation of
Older Persons (Konenreisha Shugyo Jittai Chosa), which was conducted in
October 1996 and published in December 1997 by the Ministry of Labor.
The survey covers men and women aged 55 to 69 who were employees,
company executives, self-employed, or not working. Our analysis centers
on those who were employed at age 55 and had been working until 1996.
The size of the sample we use for analysis is 4,141, out of 21,219 in the
survey.
A major problem is that the data from this survey are cross-sectional,
not longitudinal. What we know from the survey is an individual’s age, cur-
rent working status, wage income, pension beneﬁts, and so on at the survey
date. The survey asks each individual what kind of ﬁrm (industry and size)
he or she was working for at age 55, whether and when he or she would face
mandatory retirement, and when he or she wants to retire (if working at the
time of the survey). However, any other longitudinal information, includ-
ing wage proﬁles and the actual date of retirement, is not available: what we
know from the survey is just whether an individual was retired or still work-
ing in the survey year of 1996. Moreover, data on an individual’s back-
ground, such as education and family situation, are limited.
The most important quantitative information available from the survey
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rity and other beneﬁts, on which our incentive calculations are based. It is,
however, diﬃcult to capture the diversity of incentives in employer-based
pension policies, and information about lump-sum retirement beneﬁts is
not available. Moreover, answers regarding the category and amount of
beneﬁts seem at times to be unreliable, probably due to inaccurate and/or
limited knowledge among respondents about social security programs. We
estimate the theoretical value of social security beneﬁts based on projected
wage proﬁles, and make some adjustment if the discrepancy between theo-
retical and actual ﬁgures is too large to be ignored.
7.3.2 Cohorts in Focus
To estimate the impact of pension reforms on retirement decisions and
assess its ﬁnancial implications, we limit our sample to those who were
working at age 55. We use multiple birth cohorts: that is, ﬁfteen birth co-
horts of ages 55 to 69 in the survey year 1996. This is because the sample
size of a single birth cohort is very small (around 400). Individuals who are
older than age 55 in 1996 are de-aged back to age 55 by being given the pro-
jected earnings history (which is discussed in the next section) and other
characteristics they had at age 55 (which are known from the survey).
Two things should be mentioned about spousal issues. The ﬁrst is how to
obtain spousal information, which is needed to calculate family social se-
curity wealth (SSW) and other incentives to retire. Matching can be com-
pletely made if a spouse is 55 to 69 years old, since she or he is included in
the sample and her or his information is available from the survey.3 If a
spouse’s age is below 55 or above 69, however, we cannot know anything
about her or him. We exclude the latter type of individual—whose age
tends to be close to 55 or 69 in most cases—from the sample. We believe
that this adjustment has no substantial impact on the results, because we
de-age the observations aged 56 years and over back to age 55; the average
age diﬀerence between husbands and wives is in accordance with the na-
tional average.
The second issue is how to avoid spousal double counting. If both a hus-
band and his wife are included in the sample cohort, we would have their
SSW twice in the sum. We solve this problem by including only men and
single women in the analysis and incorporating all beneﬁts received by
married women (both from their own work and their husbands) in the cal-
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3. The question sheets of the survey are sent to randomly selected households that have at
least one household member aged between 55 and 69; everyone aged 55 to 69 in the surveyed
households is requested to ﬁll in the sheet and send it back to the oﬃce. Thus, for example, in
the case of a couple with a husband aged 65 and wife 63, both are included in the survey,
whereas in the case of a husband 55 and wife 53, only the husband is included. We exclude the
latter type of couples from the sample.culations for the husbands.4 The sample, after adjustment, consists of
8,101 people—3,489 couples, 548 single male workers, and 575 single fe-
male workers.
7.3.3 Earnings Projections
Backward and forward projections of wage earnings are required to an-
alyze the impact of social security incentives on retirement decisions. With
limited longitudinal information, our projections of the age-earnings pro-
ﬁles depend largely on the cross-sectional data. Also, we use information
from the Wage Census (Chingin Sensasu) to complement reported individ-
ual characteristics observed in the survey. To summarize our methodology,
we use: (1) current wage earnings as a benchmark, (2) average age-wage
proﬁles obtained from the survey for the ages 55 to 69, and (3) cohort-
speciﬁc age-earnings proﬁles in backward projections, starting at age 55
and below, obtained from the Wage Census.
For earnings projections for ages 55 to 69, we rely on average wage
growth rates observed from the survey, because cohort-speciﬁc informa-
tion is not available. To calculate average wage growth, we regress the log-
arithm of monthly earnings (for males and females, separately) on an indi-
vidual’s age, experience of mandatory retirement, job categories, ﬁrm size
at the employee’s age of 55, whether a private or public employee at 55, and
residential areas. All independent variables are dummies.
Based on this regression, we create each sample’s earnings proﬁle for the
ages 55 to 69, using the reported current wage earnings as a benchmark.
The wage growth rate is thus set to be the same for each individual: it is cal-
culated by taking the diﬀerence in parameters on the two subsequent age
dummies. The timing of mandatory retirement, which in most cases is 60
years old, is important in projecting the earnings proﬁle. We assume that
one will face mandatory retirement at 60, regardless of her or his desire to
go to secondary labor markets.
To construct earnings histories before age 55, we use age-earnings data
from the Wage Census, which is conducted and published every year by the
Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare. The Wage Census provides aver-
age age-wage proﬁles by industry, ﬁrm size, and educational background.
We project wage earnings backward, using estimated earnings at 55 as a
benchmark and also using the cohort-speciﬁc wage curve.
Based on those earnings projections, we compute SSW (Social Security
Wealth) and two kinds of incentive measures: PV (Peak Value) and OV
(Option Value) at each age for each individual.5 The technical problem
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4. We also exclude women whose husbands are assumed to be deceased.
5. See Stock and Wise (1990) and Coile and Gruber (2000a) for the deﬁnition and implica-
tions of the option value, and see Coile and Gruber (2000a, 2000b) and Gruber and Wise
(2003) for those of the peak value.here is how to deal with multiple retirement income programs: KNH, UI,
and Zaishoku beneﬁts. In the previous study (Oshio and Oishi 2004), we
captured the role of multiple retirement programs by creating weighted av-
erage incentive measures that incorporated all possible pathways to retire-
ment. We cannot allocate workers across multiple programs based on these
weights, since beneﬁts are linked to their wage proﬁles. Instead, we use the
weights to compute the weighted average of each program’s beneﬁts.
7.3.4 Model Estimates
In this section, we describe the empirical framework for regression anal-
ysis on the impact of social security on retirement. We ﬁrst have to estimate
each sample’s previous working/retirement status, since our survey tells us
only whether each sample is retired in the survey year of 1996. Hence, we
ﬁrst explain how to build up the quasi-longitudinal data; then we address
the reduced-form models of retirement decisions.
To estimate models for incentive measures we select from the survey the
individuals who were working at age 55 and are expected to have kept
working until 1995, one year before the survey year. We apply the probit
models to them to explain their retirement decisions in 1996: whether to
keep working or to retire. The main problem of our analysis is that we can-
not exactly identify those who were working in 1995, due to a lack of lon-
gitudinal information. Hence, we ﬁrst assume that those who were work-
ing in 1996 were also working in 1995. And for those who were already
retired, we only use those whose age of retirement can be identiﬁed from
their reported answers about mandatory retirement and subsequent job ex-
perience. Thus, 2,629 men and 1,075 women out of the total sample are es-
timated to have been working in 1995—whose statistical characteristics are
summarized in table 7.1.
For baseline simulations, we compute the projected work and retirement
trajectory for our cohorts under the pre-2000 Reform scheme, using the
two models with PV and OV. We use models that have controls for earn-
ings, demographics, and sectors. Each model includes SSW. For ages, we
have two types of methodologies: one with linear ages, the other with age
dummies. Earnings controls consist of projected earnings for next year, av-
erage lifetime earnings, and the squares of each. Other controls include
property income, dummies for health conditions, new occupational dum-
mies, dummies for four categories of ﬁrm size at age 55, and eight dummies
of residential areas.
Table 7.2 summarizes estimation results for men and women, respec-
tively. For men, the coeﬃcients on PV and OV are negative and signiﬁcant
in both S1 models, while in S3 models we ﬁnd negative and insigniﬁcant im-
pact of incentive measures on retirement. For women, the coeﬃcient on
PV is negative and signiﬁcant in both cases of S1 and S3, while it is in-
signiﬁcant in OV models. For both men and women (supporting intuitive
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tend to increase disincentives to work, while projected earnings tend to
decrease them. The coeﬃcient on SSW is positive in all cases, although
insigniﬁcant in some, suggesting the existence of the wealth eﬀect of SSW
on retirement; a reduced SSW is expected to encourage people to keep
working.
7.3.5  Predicted Probabilities of Retirement and Pension Reform
We can predict a probability of retirement at each age beyond 55, based
on the previously-mentioned models and projected earnings. We ﬁrst com-
pute baseline hazard rates, assuming no policy change from the pre-2000
Reform schemes. Then we consider the following four policy changes, the
last of which is speciﬁc to Japan:
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Table 7.1 Summary statistics for the estimation sample
Standard 
Mean deviation Min. Max.
Males (sample size   2,629)
Retired 0.132 0.339 0.000 1.000
SSW (billion yen) 32.748 9.412 6.100 74.558
SSA (billion yen) –0.050 2.476 –7.212 6.130
Peak value (billion yen) 1.844 3.761 –7.212 13.319
Option value (billion yen) 63.417 43.952 1.125 396.407
Property income (10 thousand yen) 2.099 13.850 0.000 500.000
Health condition: not well 0.151 0.358 0.000 1.000
Health condition: bad or sick 0.035 0.183 0.000 1.000
Projected earnings (billion yen) 3.393 2.264 0.100 14.417
Average lifetime earnings (billion yen) 3.486 1.792 0.799 7.080
Square of PE 16.635 25.715 0.010 207.860
Square of ALE 15.359 14.765 0.639 50.126
Age 61.324 3.660 55.000 69.000
Lives with spouse 0.858 0.349 0.000 1.000
Females (sample size   1,075)
Retired 0.186 0.389 0.000 1.000
SSW (billion yen) 33.633 14.838 9.057 80.908
SSA (billion yen) 0.239 1.626 –6.512 6.185
Peak value (billion yen) 1.909 3.003 –6.512 12.761
Option value (billion yen) 106.208 66.216 1.218 442.930
Property income (10 thousand yen) 0.804 3.836 0.000 66.000
Health condition: not well 0.148 0.355 0.000 1.000
Health condition: bad or sick 0.032 0.175 0.000 1.000
Projected earnings (billion yen) 1.957 1.270 0.120 12.000
Average lifetime earnings (billion yen) 1.985 1.163 0.799 7.080
Square of PE 5.440 10.762 0.014 144.000
Square of ALE 5.292 7.928 0.639 50.126
Age 59.309 3.378 55.000 69.000
Lives with spouse 0.735 0.442 0.000 1.000Table 7.2 Retirement probits
Model PV—S1 PV—S3 OP—S1 OP—S3
A. Male sample (N   2,623)
SSW 0.000 0.001 0.031 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Incentive measure –0.119 –0.071 –0.006 –0.001
(0.013) (0.042) (0.002) (0.002)
Property income 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Health condition: not well 0.287 0.299 0.278 0.303
(0.088) (0.090) (0.087) (0.091)
Health condition: bad or sick 1.075 1.133 1.084 1.158
(0.154) (0.167) (0.150) (0.152)
Projected earnings –0.240 –0.227 –0.990 –0.274
(0.406) (0.485) (0.399) (0.494)
Average lifetime earnings 0.781 0.793 1.374 0.847
(0.381) (0.447) (0.397) (0.458)
Square of PE 0.009 0.009 0.048 0.011
(0.021) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025)
Square of ALE –0.097 –0.099 –0.127 –0.102
(0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027)
Age –0.038 –0.068
(0.019) (0.021)
Age 55 0.509 0.524
(0.364) (0.358)
Age 56 0.207 0.420
(0.385) (0.369)
Age 57 –0.247 –0.099
(0.416) (0.404)
Age 58 0.225 0.429
(0.392) (0.397)
Age 59 0.537 1.336
(0.609) (0.398)
Age 60 0.871 1.406
(0.496) (0.396)
Age 61 0.023 0.545
(0.512) (0.427)
Age 62 0.312 0.839
(0.516) (0.431)
Age 63 0.128 0.651
(0.529) (0.454)
Age 64 0.606 1.029
(0.471) (0.428)
Age 65 0.174 0.576
(0.479) (0.449)
Age 66 0.099 0.507
(0.521) (0.491)
Age 67 –0.247 0.156
(0.545) (0.487)
Age 68 –0.077 0.322
(0.548) (0.543)
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.208 0.135 0.207
Other controls Yes Yes Yes YesTable 7.2 (continued)
Model PV—S1 PV—S3 OP—S1 OP—S3
B. Female sample (N   1,075)
SSW 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Incentive measure –0.137 –0.163 –0.001 0.001
(0.026) (0.067) (0.002) (0.002)
Property income 0.056 0.056 0.058 0.057
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Health condition: not well 0.138 0.194 0.152 0.209
(0.132) (0.134) (0.130) (0.135)
Health condition: bad or sick 1.230 1.242 1.129 1.255
(0.231) (0.238) (0.229) (0.238)
Projected earnings –0.288 –0.535 –0.794 –0.664
(0.461) (0.485) (0.440) (0.482)
Average lifetime earnings 0.330 0.626 0.766 0.618
(0.536) (0.539) (0.536) (0.540)
Square of PE 0.043 0.061 0.068 0.065
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Square of ALE –0.095 –0.121 –0.118 –0.110
(0.071) (0.065) (0.072) (0.066)
Age –0.029 0.036
(0.022) (0.024)
Age 55 0.321 0.432
(0.238) (0.234)
Age 56 0.067 0.554
(0.309) (0.252)
Age 57 0.418 0.843
(0.286) (0.247)
Age 58 0.060 0.607
(0.324) (0.271)
Age 59 –0.142 1.253
(0.601) (0.279)
Age 60 0.225 1.270
(0.469) (0.284)
Age 61 0.044 1.117
(0.490) (0.317)
Age 62 –0.433 0.656
(0.515) (0.365)
Age 63 –0.675 0.454
(0.521) (0.380)
Age 64 0.275 1.314
(0.494) (0.391)
Age 65 –0.216 0.795
(0.542) (0.454)
Age 66 –0.276 0.759
(0.607) (0.759)
Age 67 –0.981 0.182
(0.544) (0.418)
Age 68 –0.283 0.699
(0.725) (0.616)
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.172 0.125 0.168
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Other control variables are 9 occupational dummies, dummies for 4 categories of es-
tablishment size, and 8 regional dummies. The estimated parameters on these variables are
not reported. Numbers in parentheses show robust standard errors.• The Three-Year Reform calls for a three-year increase in the ages of
early and normal retirement age (ERA and NRA hereafter). In Japan,
this means shifting the ERA to 63 from 60 and the NRA to 68 from 65.
In this reform, we assume that the spouse retires at the original ERA,
both before and after the reform.
• The Actuarial Reform implements a 6 percent annual actuarial ad-
justment per year away from the NRA, without changing the ERA,
NRA, or replacement rate. In this reform, we assume that beneﬁts be-
come available at the existing ERA level and keep beneﬁts at the NRA
the same as in the current system.
• The Common Reform calls for a common system, with (1) the ERA of
60, the NRA of 65, (2) a beneﬁt equal to 60 percent of the lesser of av-
erage indexed lifetime earnings and the 90th percentile of the wage dis-
tribution for men, (3) a 6 percent per year actuarial adjustment, and
(4) a survivor beneﬁt equal to 100 percent of her or his spouse’s bene-
ﬁt.6 We assume that if a person retires before age 60 she or he still re-
ceives beneﬁts starting at age 60, and that taxation of beneﬁts is the
same as in the base case.
• The JP 2000 Reform calls for an NRA of 65, with no ERA, and a 5
percent reduction in earning-related beneﬁts, reﬂecting the ﬁnal stage
implied by the Pension Reform.
For all of these four reforms, we consider three methodologies regarding
ages to check the sensitivity of the results to the treatment of ages in the es-
timated models: S1, based on the models with linear ages; S2, based on the
models with age dummies, leaving them unchanged; and S3, based on and
incrementing the models with age dummies. We perform these simulations
by taking the estimated retirement model, plugging in new incentive mea-
sures and possibly new retirement ages, and estimating for each individual
a new probability of retirement. Also, it should be remembered that the
Japanese system already has an ERA of 60 and an NRA of 65, and that the
JP 2000 Reform calls for no beneﬁt at all before age 65.7
7.4 Simulation Methodology
7.4.1 Methodology
The goal of our simulation is to estimate the impact of pension reforms
on older workers’ net ﬁscal contributions to retirement income ﬁnances.
306 Akiko S. Oishi and Takashi Oshio
6. In Japan, a widow can receive the maximum of (a) three-fourths of her husband’s worker
beneﬁt, (b) the full amount of her own beneﬁt, and (c) half of her husband’s worker beneﬁt
and half of her own worker beneﬁt, in addition to her Basic Pension beneﬁt. The ﬁrst option
is chosen in most cases, since womens’ wage income is much lower than mens’, and women
work shorter years than men. A widower cannot receive the survivor beneﬁt.
7. Disability pension beneﬁts are available, but they are strictly targeted to accidentally
handicapped people, not used for transitory income support until the normal eligibility age.Such reforms will have two eﬀects: (1) an automatic eﬀect on ﬁscal con-
tributions, by changing contributions and beneﬁts for a given work his-
tory, and (2) an additional eﬀect, through labor supply responses to the re-
form. We will estimate the ﬁscal implications of both, using the retirement
model. It should be noted, however, that the result is an estimate of the
steady-state impact of the reforms, with the transitory path neglected for
simplicity.
The steps that we take are summarized in what follows. First, we project
each worker’s wage earnings forward (based on the predicted wage earn-
ings) and backward (based on the Wage Census), as well as his or her SSW
and incentive measures at each age.
Second, we obtain his or her estimated probability of exit at each age by
multiplying incentive measures (and other time-independent variables
augmented for the current age and year) by the estimated coeﬃcients in the
probit functions and plug through the normal distribution. We also ex-
plicitly account for the probability of dying at each age from the oﬃcial
mortality tables—to know whether he or she remains in the labor force, re-
tires, or dies.
Third, we calculate net SSW at each age for those exiting the labor force
to retirement and those exiting it to death, corresponding to the social se-
curity system that is applied to them. For couples, we calculate the SSW
values, assuming that the spouse retires at the ERA. Net SSW is calculated
for the entire family’s SS payroll taxes and other taxes at each age, paid by
both spouses.
Fourth, we get the expected net SSW of those exiting the labor force at
each age, by multiplying the probabilities of entering retirement and of
death by the net SSW associated with these states.
Fifth, we add the expected net SSW across all potential states, to calcu-
late the average SSW that the individual is expected to receive under a
given social security scheme. From the government’s viewpoint, this aver-
age SSW is the net payment to the individual who leaves the labor force.
The diﬀerence of the level between the baseline case and alternative re-
form scenarios quantitatively shows the ﬁnancial implications of the re-
forms.
Finally, we separate out the ﬁscal eﬀects of the reforms that automati-
cally arise due to changes in program rules and those that arise due to la-
bor supply responses. We call the former the mechanical eﬀect and the lat-
ter the behavioral eﬀect. We compute the mechanical eﬀect by simulating
the paths of taxes and beneﬁts without assuming any change in retirement
behavior: that is, taking the baseline path of exiting the labor market and
applying this path to the new taxes/beneﬁts structure. We then obtain the
ﬁscal implications of the behavioral eﬀect as the diﬀerence between the to-
tal eﬀect and the mechanical eﬀect.
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The methodology discussed in the previous section is largely applicable
to Japan, but there are some minor issues that more particularly arise for
Japan. First, we have to ignore the survivor pension beneﬁt for dependent
children, for simplicity. We have little information about an individual’s
family members, and survivor pension beneﬁts for dependent children are
generally strict, especially if they are older than 18. We also ignore the pos-
sibility of divorce after age 55.
Second, in calculating taxes, we include all payroll taxes (SS contribu-
tions paid by both employees and employers), personal income taxes, and
consumption taxes (VAT), to assess the magnitude of a change in tax rev-
enues at both the SS budget and total government budget. The consump-
tion tax rate is currently 5 percent in Japan, and we roughly estimate con-
sumption tax revenues by multiplying personal disposable income by the
consumption-tax factor, which is calculated so that for the economy as a
whole VAT revenues   consumption tax factor   personal disposable in-
come in the national accounts.8
Third, there is a risk that we may overestimate the impact on older work-
ers’ labor supply in Japan, since there are limited chances to get a full-time
job after age 60. We cannot rule out the case that a substantial part of pol-
icy incentives to stimulate working will be induced to ﬁrms rather than
older workers through a reduction in wage. Our methodology assumes that
additional labor supply, which is stimulated by pension reforms, can be
smoothly realized without a reduction in wage.
7.5 Simulation Results
7.5.1 Main Results
Table 7.3 shows the present discounted values of gross and net SS bene-
ﬁts for the four reforms—the Three-Year, Actuarial, Common, and JP
2000 Reforms—in comparison with the base case. For each, the eﬀect of
the reform on tax revenues is broken down into payroll taxes (SS contribu-
tions), income taxes, and consumption taxes. The calculations are based on
PV and OV models and methodologies S1, S2, and S3—that is, six types of
combination. The numbers are reported in euros per worker.9
This table indicates that the ﬁnancial implications depend on the type of
308 Akiko S. Oishi and Takashi Oshio
8. The tax rate was 3 percent in the survey year 1996, but we use the current 5 percent to as-
sess the impact of the reforms on consumption tax revenues. The consumption tax factor is
assumed to be equal to 0.0397, which is implicitly calculated from national accounts and tax
statistics.
9. We use the CPI to put values in 2001 yen, and translate them to euros using the Decem-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9reform, and that their extent relies heavily on the combination of models and
methodologies. We ﬁnd that net beneﬁts decline in all cases, although the
magnitude of reduction relies much on the type of reform and the combina-
tion of models and methodologies. First, the Three-Year Reform saves net
beneﬁts by 13.2 percent to 19.2 percent, with S3 reducing them more than
S1 and S2. The Actuarial Reform turns to be somewhat more eﬀective than
the Three-Year Reform in saving the beneﬁts, suggesting that the current
system is more generous than actuarially fair. In sharp contrast to these two
reforms, the Common Reform fails to signiﬁcantly reduce net beneﬁts. To be
sure, the proposed actuarial adjustment incorporated in this reform should
reduce the beneﬁts, as suggested in the case of the Actuarial Reform. This
eﬀect seems to be, however, mostly oﬀset by the proposed beneﬁt at 65 (equal
to 60 percent of the average indexed lifetime earnings) and the survivor ben-
eﬁt (equal to 100 percent of her or his spouse’s beneﬁt)—both of which are
more generous than in the current system. Actually, we ﬁnd little change in
gross beneﬁts from the base case. Finally, the JP 2000 Reform, which reduces
net beneﬁts by 20.8 percent to 28.9 percent, is more eﬀective than the other
three reforms, mainly because it pays no pension beneﬁts until age 65 and
incorporates a 5 percent reduction of earnings-related beneﬁts.
In addition, dividing the impact into the changes in gross beneﬁts and
taxes, we ﬁnd that reforms other than the Common Reform succeed in re-
ducing gross beneﬁts, with the Three-Year Reform raising tax revenues
most. This result suggests that the Three-Year Reform is more eﬀective in
postponing exit from labor force (see the following).
Table 7.4 divides the impact into the mechanical eﬀect and the ﬁscal im-
plications of the behavioral eﬀect. In all cases, most of the ﬁnancial eﬀect
can be attributed to the mechanical eﬀect; the ﬁscal implications of the be-
havioral eﬀect are relatively small, even positive in some models. This prob-
ably reﬂects two factors: (1) limited responsiveness of retirement to incen-
tive measures, which is implied by small coeﬃcients on them, as reported
in tables 7.2, panels A and B, and (2) the actuarial adjustment already in-
corporated in the current scheme (especially for the earnings-related com-
ponent).10The eﬀects of the proposed reforms thus center on the eligibility
conditions and beneﬁt payment scheme, rather than changes in the work-
ing/retirement behavior of the elderly.
The results in tables 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 also depend greatly on the model
speciﬁcations and estimation methodologies. We ﬁnd that OV tends to
produce a greater reduction in net beneﬁts than PV, while S3 tends to pro-
duce a larger reduction than S1 and S2. The estimated impact is the biggest
for the combination of OV and S3 and is the smallest for the combination
of PV and S2, with some exceptions.
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10. In addition, older workers receive WS, which is a subsidy equivalent to 15 percent of












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































87.5.2 Interpreting the Results
Figures 7.1 to 7.7 are useful in interpreting the simulation results dis-
cussed in the previous section. We focus on the Three-Year Reform, based
on the OV model, to save space.
Figure 7.1 indicates how the reform changes gross SSW by age of retire-
ment from the base case. The reform reduces gross SSW at each age, prob-
ably encouraging people to work via the negative wealth eﬀect, while the
gap with the base case becomes the narrowest at age 65, which is the NRA.
By contrast, the reform raises taxes from the base case at each age, as indi-
cated in ﬁgure 7.2. This is mainly because increased eligibility ages make
people pay more taxes (mostly payroll taxes) while working, as indicated in
table 7.4.
Figure 7.3 shows how the distribution of the retirement age changes
from the base case. The reform does not change the spike at age 60, and it
raises the probability of labor-force exit for people aged 62 and above and
lowers it for younger people, suggesting a rise in the average retirement age.
People aged 68 and above show little response to the reform. These results
point to relatively small behavioral eﬀect, which is again consistent with
the results in table 7.4.
Figure 7.4 depicts the distribution of the total eﬀect of the reform in
terms of gross and net SSW. This ﬁgure shows that the reform succeeds in
reducing SSW substantially for people aged 62 and younger but raises
SSW between ages 63 and 67, in line with a change in the distribution of the
retirement age, shown in ﬁgure 7.3. In addition, we observe no substantial
impact beyond age 68, which is the new NRA.
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Fig. 7.1 SSW by age of labor force exitFigures 7.5 and 7.6 show how the previously-mentioned results change
if we use the S3 model instead of the S1 model. Figure 7.5 shows a clear
rightward shift in the spike of retirement age, probably reﬂecting a rise in
age dummies incorporated in S3. Correspondingly, the total eﬀect shows a
sharp contrast at old and new spikes of labor-force exit: both gross and net
SSW decline sharply at ages 60 and 61, while they jump at 63 and 64, re-
ﬂecting an increase in the early retirement age.
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Fig. 7.2 Taxes by age of labor force exit
Fig. 7.3 Distribution of age of labor force exit (OV-S1 Model)Finally, ﬁgure 7.7 summarizes the ﬁscal implications of the Three-Year
Reform under the combinations of PV/OV and S1/S2/S3. This ﬁgure shows
the results in terms of a share of nominal GDP to assess the magnitude of
the impact for the whole economy and enable comparisons across coun-
tries. Our sample consists of only private-sector employees, who are mostly
KNH members. Public-sector employees are covered by Kyosai-Kumiai,
which has almost the same structure as KNH but is independent. Also,
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Fig. 7.4 Total eﬀect by age of retirement (OV-S1 Model)
Fig. 7.5 Distribution of age of labor force exit (OV-S3 Model)self-employed workers receive only Basic Pension beneﬁts and pay the ﬂat-
rate contributions. Thus, we scale up the results for private-sector employ-
ees, estimating what percentage of people aged 55 are covered by KNH.
Two things should be noted about this ﬁgure. First, the size of the total
impact of reforms is around 0.4 percent of nominal GDP, which is not sub-
stantial, but cannot be neglected, especially given the lower growth poten-
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Fig. 7.6 Total eﬀect by age of retirement (OV-S3 Model)
Fig. 7.7 Fiscal implications of reform as a percent of GDPtial in Japan. Second, and more interestingly, the mechanical eﬀect domi-
nates ﬁscal implications of the behavioral eﬀect in all cases, as is already
suggested by a change in the distributions of the retirement age and of the
total eﬀect.
7.5.3 Distributional Issues
The proposed pension reforms seem to have diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent
income groups. For considering distributional issues, we divide the sample
into quintiles according to real family average lifetime earnings, and show
how a change in net beneﬁt is distributed by lifetime income group.
The results are summarized in table 7.5, panels A and B, for the combi-
nations of OV-S1 and OV-S3, respectively. Table 7.5, panel A shows that:
(1) the Three-Year Reform aﬀects each quintile almost equally, (2) the Ac-
tuarial and JP 2000 Reforms are more favorable for people with lower in-
come than people with higher income, reducing net beneﬁts somewhat
more for people with higher income, and (3) the Common Reform in-
creases net beneﬁts for people with higher income and reduces them for
those with a lower income. The regressive feature of the Common Reform
can be explained by its increase in the survivor beneﬁt, which is favorable
for rich couples.
However, the progressiveness of other reforms is also limited, reﬂecting
the doubledecker feature of the KNH, which has the ﬂat-rate basic beneﬁt
as well as the earnings-related beneﬁt. The proposed increase in the eligi-
bility age is biased toward a reduction in the basic beneﬁt component over
one’s lifetime, which is relatively harmful to poor workers. To richer work-
ers, on the other hand, the longer period of contributions incorporated by
the reforms adds to earnings-related beneﬁts, which partly (or more) oﬀset
a reduction in the basic beneﬁt.
7.6 Conclusions
Our analysis has several limitations. First, it is an analysis about the
steady-state impacts on some speciﬁc cohorts, not about the transition to
the new steady state. And the proposed pension reforms cannot be imple-
mented immediately; they have to incorporate many adjustments for co-
horts in transition. Second, it does not incorporate any general equilibrium
eﬀects that might occur. Third, we neglect how ﬁrms will respond to an in-
crease in labor supply of the elderly; they might reduce wage and absorb
some of the impact from reforms.
However, our policy simulations show that the proposed pension re-
forms can mitigate strong pressures on social security ﬁnances from aging.
We ﬁnd, especially, that postponing eligibility ages can signiﬁcantly reduce
net SS payments, mainly through the mechanical eﬀect that arises auto-
matically due to changes in program rules. The ﬁscal implications of be-
324 Akiko S. Oishi and Takashi Oshiohavioral eﬀects are relatively small, because of limited responsiveness of
retirement to incentive measures and the actuarial adjustment already in-
corporated in the current scheme. Simulation results heavily depend on
model speciﬁcations and estimation methodologies, but they clearly sug-
gest that encouraging work in older age should be an eﬀective way to help
mitigate aging-related pressures on the government budget.
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